This is an adaptation of a paper written by Matt Goolding in December 2022, submitted to the University of Groningen as part of the Methodology & Research Practice course in the pre-master programme for MA International Relations.
How have proponents of Scottish independence responded to the UK leaving the EU? A chronology of Nicola Sturgeon’s discourse, 2016-2022
This article investigates how Nicola Sturgeon, leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP), responded publicly to the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union. It follows Fairclough and Fairclough’s (2011) framework for analysing political discourse, integrating argumentation theory—specifically the concept of practical reasoning—with critical discourse analysis (CDA) to analyse Sturgeon’s speeches.
This reveals three distinct phases between 2016-2022 characterised by three dominant evolving arguments; for remaining in the EU’s Single Market and Customs Union, for holding a second EU membership referendum, and for permitting Scotland to conduct a second independence referendum.
On 23 June 2016, the people of the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU). Two years prior, in September 2014, the people of Scotland had voted to remain part of the UK. While it is perhaps unfair to describe the independence cause as ‘dormant’ after the 2014 result, there certainly seemed little prospect of any impending referendum re-run. The vote was portrayed by many as a ‘once in a generation opportunity’ (Paun, Sergeant, & Henderson, 2018). All this changed after the ‘Brexit’ referendum as it became clear that 62% of Scots voted to remain in the EU—but the UK as a whole voted to leave by 52% to 48%.
This substantial gap reinvigorated the independence debate. On the morning of 24 June 2016, Scottish National Party (SNP) leader Nicola Sturgeon stepped up to deliver a speech; ‘The Scottish Parliament should have the right to hold another referendum if there is a significant and material change in the circumstances that prevailed in 2014, such as Scotland being taken out of the EU against our will. Scotland does now face that prospect—it is a significant and material change in circumstances—and it is therefore a statement of the obvious that the option of a second referendum must be on the table. And it is on the table.’ (Sturgeon, 2016).
Negotiations between the UK and the EU continued until 31 December 2020, when Britain formally withdrew from the bloc. These talks were fraught with complications and delays, while securing a deal was made yet more challenging by the UK Parliament, where members repeatedly rejected the terms on offer. Throughout this four-year period, and in the two years since, Sturgeon has remained steadfast in her determination to force another Scottish independence referendum.
This research tracks the prominence of this goal in her public speeches, investigates the themes present in her arguments, and maps out the key discursive constants and variables between June 2016 and December 2022.
Literature review
There is a wealth of literature investigating Scottish history, nationalism, and independence. Many of these accounts focus, to varying extents, on the reasons for, origins of, and characteristics of Scottish nationalism—and/or the causes of the 2014 independence referendum and/or its outcome. These accounts provide useful context; a background to the current demands for secession and the continued success of the SNP; a party with an explicitly pro-independence agenda which at the time of writing (January 2023) holds nearly half of the seats in the Scottish Parliament and three-quarters of all Scottish seats in the UK Parliament.
I won’t offer a comprehensive overview of the historical literature on Scottish nationalism here, although I will introduce some of the more pertinent accounts in relation to my research question. First, I set the scene on the discernible characteristics of current Scottish nationalist identity; these are key to our understanding of Sturgeon’s discursive representations. Thereafter, I introduce substantial accounts of the SNP’s discourse in relation to independence and in relation to the UK leaving the EU.
I have consciously limited the content of this section to recent literature, due to the intensity of political upheaval in Britain over the past decade. This period was dominated by the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, the 2016 European referendum, and the Covid-19 pandemic. It was a tumultuous period in British politics; between 2016 and 2022, the UK had five different Prime Ministers.
Political scientist Michael Keating (2017), for example, lays out the major discussion points that framed the first independence referendum in 2014; highlighting the debated issues of identity, economy, welfare, and external dimensions such as questions of EU and NATO membership (Keating, 2017). For Keating, the debate has largely been focused on valence issues; and in the 2014 referendum the different sides ‘did not, by and large, pitch radically different visions of Scotland’s future’ (Keating, 2017, p. 18). Rather, both sought to claim the middle ground. He suggests that the Scottish identity ‘is available to both unionists and to nationalists.’ (Keating, 2017, p. 17)—and that, as a result, identity-based appeals were available to both sides. According to Keating, the ‘us and them’ division was not emphasised during the 2014 campaigns. Rather, each side sought to ‘reconstruct the nation of Scotland or Britain with substantive social values’ (Keating, 2017, p. 18). For Keating, Scottish nationalism is an example of ‘modern’ nationalism, whereby the appeal is ‘not on particularism but on universal values, with the nation as the appropriate place to realize them.’ (Keating, 2017, p. 6).
Charles King (2012) argues in a similar vein that independent (self-determinant) policy-making is the most important factor for independence proponents in Scotland, not ‘traditional’ nationalist factors such as territory or identity. Therefore, he argues the Scottish nationalism we see at the moment is ‘postmodern’ in nature. (King, cited in Duerr, 2015, p. 78). This echoes accounts from other scholars who argue that the SNP represents a ‘civic’ form of nationalism in Scotland; where membership is based on residency rather than ethnicity (Duclos, 2016). In fact, Darel. E. Paul claims that the SNP ‘and the wider Scottish nationalist movement stand as the world’s premier contemporary example of secessionist civic nationalism’ (Paul, 2020, p. 167). This civic nationalism, he argues, tends to be ‘oriented toward universalism’, characterised by ‘toleration, accommodation, and diversity’, and construed as ‘voluntarist, individualist, rational, political’ (Paul, 2020, p. 169).
This stands in stark contrast to ethnic forms of nationalism, and while there is hotly-contested debate about the clarity of this ethnic-civic distinction (Paul, 2020), it is nonetheless essential to how the SNP perceives itself and represents its identity in the public arena (Duclos, 2016; Manley, 2022, Mycock, 2012; Paul, 2020).
The distinction is relevant here because ‘a commitment to a self-defined civic form of nationalism requires from its leaders a civic performance of that nationalism’ (Paul, 2020, p. 168). It is this performance that is under investigation when we review Sturgeon’s speeches.
Whether or not there are indeed ethnic underpinnings to the SNP’s style of nationalism, my assessment is based on Sturgeon seeing herself as a conscious agent of the pro-EU, pro-independence cause; projecting civic, liberal, and universal ideals.
In her own words, ‘it shouldn’t be surprising that belief in Scottish independence—which is about self-government, not about ethnicity—goes hand in hand with a strong belief in internationalism and interdependence. National identity is not, and never should be, an exclusive concept.’ (Sturgeon, 2019).
There are two particularly influential works that must be cited here.
First, Thiec (2021) has tracked the impact of Brexit on the SNP’s overall independence narrative. She focuses on how the SNP painted the picture of ‘the sort of country that people in Scotland wanted to live in’ (Thiec, 2021, para. 34); contrasting this with representations of ‘broken Brexit Britain’ (Blackford, 2019, as cited in Thiec, 2021, para. 33). Thiec shows that the SNP consciously distanced itself from UK government policy and framed an independent EU-member Scotland as being part of a ‘family of independent nations’ (Thiec, 2021, para. 33). She highlights an emphasis on the positive aspects of immigration, both in the context of EU freedom of movement and in the context of Europe’s refugee crisis (Thiec, 2021).
My research reveals similar patterns, though as I outline later in this section, I emphasise the operational and practical applications of these discursive themes.
Another highly relevant—and duly inspirational in this respect—piece of literature is Stuart Whigham’s (2019) analysis of manifestos and policy documents from the SNP and its opponents—Scottish Labour, Scottish Conservative Party, and the Unionist Party. His work ‘examines the predominant narratives which emanated from party political discourse in relation to the 2014 Scottish independence referendum’ using Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough’s (2011) framework for political discourse analysis (Whigham, 2019, p. 1212).
This approach integrates argumentation theory—specifically the concept of ‘practical reasoning’—with critical discourse analysis (CDA). At the heart of their framework is the view that political discourse is an argument for or against a normative action (Whigham, 2019). Fairclough and Fairclough (2011) argue that ‘as long as normative claims and decisions are justified by reasons (even by ‘bad’ reasons, e.g. unacceptable, irrelevant or insufficient reasons), practical reasoning (and argumentation more generally) constitutes an integral part of political discourse.’ (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2011, p. 244).
Practical reasoning, according to Fairclough and Fairclough, is embodied in practical arguments about ‘what to do’—it attempts to ‘motivate us (or give us good reasons) to act.’ (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2011, p. 245). It involves ‘arguing in favour of a conclusion (claim) that one should act in a particular way as a means for achieving some desirable goal or end.’ (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2011, p. 246). This emerges from a set of situations; ‘circumstantial premises’ that are chiefly presented as the problem that needs to be solved. (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2011, p. 244).
Figure 1
Fairclough and Fairclough’s proposal for the structure of practical arguments
From Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students (p. 48), by Fairclough, I., & Fairclough, N. 2012. Copyright 2012. Taylor & Francis Group.
Critics of this framework question the necessary relationship between these features—for example, the consideration of circumstances as always being a premise for an argument (Tseronis, 2013).
However, this is the lens through which I view my own research. The speeches delivered by Nicola Sturgeon are analysed here as a form of argumentation. And to demonstrate the prevailing narratives and discursive themes, I rely on Fairclough and Fairclough’s framework for conducting discourse analysis.
Turning to Whigham’s own research, he does not merely emphasise the problematic, unwanted, circumstances, but also that Scotland is presented as being ‘an ancient, outward-looking, wealthy and compassionate nation’ (Whigham, 2019, p. 1222). This is contrasted with the unwanted circumstance of an ‘unequal economic model’ that prioritises London (Whigham, 2019, p. 1222), and narratives about Scotland as a ‘submerged nation’ hampered by lack of political independence (Whigham, 2019, p. 1223).
He points to a core ideological value of the SNP being a belief in ‘Scotland’s future in Scotland’s hands’ (Whigham, 2019, p. 1223) and a ‘gradualist’ value emphasising the severing of political union without severing non-political ties (Whigham, 2019, p. 1224). Finally, this research uncovers the goal presented in SNP discourse as ‘the establishment of an independent, sovereign Scottish state’, with independence presented more as a means to an end than an end in itself (Whigham, 2019, p. 1225).
Whigham concludes that ‘the SNP’s overarching emphasis on the premodern existence of an independent Scottish nation, and the concurrent resonance with ethnosymbolist rhetoric, acted as a central tenet of their attempts to normalise their ‘imaginary’ future independent Scottish state’ (Whigham, 2019, p. 1234).
This paper builds on Whigham’s research in that it brings us up-to-date on pro-independence discourse in light of a tumultuous post-Brexit period. However, it is distinct from Whigham’s work in three ways: i) Whigham looks at multiple parties, while this paper focuses only on the SNP, ii) my dataset consists of a set of speeches, rather than party publications and manifestos, and iii) my circumstantial point of departure is the UK voting to leave the EU rather than an ongoing independence campaign, as it was in 2013-2014.
Research design and methodology
This research question is best answered using grounded theory—an interpretive, qualitative research approach.
This article is, above all, descriptive, in that it reveals the discursive themes present in Sturgeon’s arguments (in other words, her practical reasoning). I consciously do not attempt to build any sort of generalisable theory; my investigation is narrowly-focused and intended as an individual contribution to our understanding of nationalist discourse in a period of acute social disruption and political change.
My work could be said to be rooted in the ‘linguistic turn’ within the social sciences (Neumann, 2002); I view language and discourse not as merely descriptive, but as a productive force. In this sense, I borrow from poststructuralist approaches—I perceive Sturgeon’s speeches to be performative; creating and reinforcing the legitimisation of a world where Scotland is better off as an independent nation within the EU.
That said, there is one major foundational correlation to clarify; that is, the correlation between Brexit and the resurgent demand for a second Scottish independence referendum.
One could argue this as self-evident, but it’s still prudent to clarify the link. The aforementioned representation of a ‘material change in circumstances’ (SNP, 2016) since 2014 is one datapoint, while Nicola Sturgeon’s own words provide further evidence: ‘Before the 2014 referendum on independence, one of the key arguments made by those who opposed independence was that Scotland could only safeguard our place in the EU if we stayed in the UK. That argument turned out to be rather false.’ (Sturgeon, 2016).
As part of my research design, I considered which subject(s) and which material to analyse. Proponents of independence go beyond SNP leaders—from Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) and Members of the UK Parliament (MPs), to SNP party members, journalists, academics, and the public. The response to Brexit may vary substantially between these cohorts, depending on their viewpoints. Narrowing down to one person—a conscious leading agent of the pro-independence and pro-EU cause—provides a measure of control.
Moreover, there is no shortage of source material. For example, Nicola Sturgeon’s speeches between June 2016 and December 2022 provide us with more than 350,0000 words. The conscious agency also factors into my decision to limit this research to pre-written speeches. While there is undoubtedly a wealth of insight to be found in debates, interviews, and media appearances, I am interested in what Sturgeon chooses to say in the most controlled, calculated, and stable conditions.
In accepting that practical reasoning and argumentation is inherent in political discourse (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2011) I argue that these monologues do provide reliable evidence of the public arguments employed by Sturgeon following the UK’s decision to leave the EU against Scotland’s will (Sturgeon, 2017).
Furthermore, it was important to take chronology into account here.
There was widespread uncertainty about the consequences of various exit arrangements and their subsequent impact on the UK economy. For example, the rejection by the UK parliament of Prime Minister Theresa May’s Withdrawal Agreement increased the likelihood of a ‘no-deal’ withdrawal, which was presented by leading economists as a damaging scenario (Wachowiak, 2020). This represents constantly-changing circumstances (i.e. new social contexts) for Sturgeon. After the introduction of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) on 1 May 2021, trade dropped significantly (OBR, March 2022; CEPR, July 2022) and created new circumstances.
For this reason, I intended to present my analysis in a year-by-year chronology. However, in line with the principles of interpretive research, I allowed patterns to emerge from the data. Analysing the texts actually revealed three distinct chronological phases through the timeline studied (2016-2022):
First, the period immediately following the Brexit referendum, characterised by calls to remain within the Single Market and Customs Union, and for the UK government to respect the wishes of Scotland to remain in the EU—to seek a differentiated solution for Scotland. This is also characterised by highly emotive internationalist language.
The second phase is characterised by UK-EU negotiations, the realisation that a ‘hard’ Brexit is probable, and the possibility of the UK leaving the EU without a trade deal becomes a realistic possibility. At this point, the ‘goals’ and ‘claims for action’ emphasise the need for a second referendum once the terms of an exit deal are understood.
The third phase, I argue, is characterised by Sturgeon’s argument that a second Scottish independence referendum is the only path forward; a time when exit terms certainly did not include Single Market and Customs Union membership, moving into the post-Brexit era with negative consequences of the UK leaving the EU beginning to appear.
Naturally, there is significant overlap.
For example, the demand for a second independence referendum has always been present. On 24 June 2016, Sturgeon explicitly states that ‘all options need to be on the table’ (Sturgeon, 2016).
This research is therefore an attempt to reveal these emerging points of discursive emphasis. Furthermore, it is important to note that the ‘options on the table’ did not narrow in a strictly linear way towards a second Scottish independence referendum. The prospect of a second European referendum was not initially presented by Sturgeon in 2016; it was pitched as a new alternative route to protecting Scotland’s interests around 2018-2019.
My analytical process followed five steps:
Access and download the content of Nicola Sturgeon’s speeches from the Scottish Government’s online archive;
Upload the text into the qualitative analysis software, Delve;
Use an open coding process to break up the transcripts into consumable chunks;
Use an axial coding process to manually match pieces of text to the five ‘structured features’ (Whigham, 2019, p. 1219) of political discourse (argumentation); circumstances, values, goals, means-goals, and the claims for action;
Reassess these coded snippets to then present the emergent themes.
In total, 133 speeches were processed using this method, and evaluated for variant textual references to Brexit and Scottish independence; though not all contained references to these themes and I omitted Sturgeon’s daily Covid-19 updates.
A clear limitation of my approach is that I have only coded transcripts explicitly containing relevant themes to my research question. Therefore, implicit, yet highly-relevant, argumentation is certainly missing from this account. For example, a statement that Scotland succeeds in attracting inward investment (Sturgeon, 2020) is not explicitly pro-independence, yet it may conceivably form part of Sturgeon’s practical reasoning for Scotland to become independent (and/or part of the EU).
This paper was written in January 2023, and therefore December 2022 was a natural end-point. Later research would benefit from extending this analysis into 2023 and beyond.
Important note: In February 2023, Nicola Sturgeon announced her intention to step down from SNP leadership.
Discussion
What we generally see through 2016-2022 is an attempt by Sturgeon to appeal, on record, directly to the UK government. In fact, she states explicitly that her proposals are ‘aimed, first and foremost, at the UK government’ (Sturgeon, 2016). However, while the ‘claims for action’ below are dominated by actions the UK government should take, I argue that she is appealing to other audiences who have an indirect and/or long-term influence. This is made clear in April 2019, when Sturgeon says; ‘“With public sentiment nothing can fail. Without it, nothing can succeed.” These are the wise words of Abraham Lincoln.’ She continues, ‘If we are successful in further growing the support and the demand for independence… then no UK government will be able to deny the will of the people or stop that will being expressed.’ (Sturgeon, 2019).
I argue that there is an implicit ‘claim for action’ running through all Sturgeon’s practical reasoning; that the people of Scotland should support Scotland in becoming an independent nation.
In itself, ‘support’ hardly sounds like a meaningful action. But when we take into account the utility of opinion polls in political argument (Gallup, 1965; Henn, 1997; Roper, 1985; Pack, 2022), support does have a function. Not only can it justify claims for action, but with discourse as a productive force, a new ‘state of affairs’ is created and reinforced by media representations of public sentiment in light of poll results.
1. Phase one: protecting Scotland’s interests
Note: Using a flowchart diagram in this blog framework renders the text too small to be legible. Therefore, I have presented each argumentation feature in individual sections.
Circumstances:
The people of Scotland voted to remain in the EU (62%), yet they face losing their EU citizenship against their will. Unionists had argued in 2014 that Scottish independence would put EU membership at risk, yet the opposite was the case. The UK leaving the EU is a material change of circumstances as outlined in the SNP’s 2016 manifesto. There is a climate of uncertainty caused by an absence of leadership and a lack of advance planning. The UK is at the end of a long campaign characterised by hate, fear, negativity, and division. Scotland remains an outward-looking nation; a champion of diversity and internationalism. Scotland voted to remain, but 1 million in Scotland voted to leave the EU.
Values:
Scottish government working in good faith to influence negotiations between the UK and EU. Values of solidarity, cooperation, and democracy that underpin the EU. Scotland committed to the EU. Scotland as an open, inclusive, and welcoming nation. Diversity as a strength; aligning with EU fundamentals of freedom, democracy, rule of law, equality, and human dignity/rights. A commitment to internationalism and values of international cooperation. The Scottish government is putting the interests of the people first.
Goals:
To protect Scotland’s interests. To prevent the UK government opting for a ‘hard’ Brexit. To retain the benefits of EU membership for Scotland, specifically the Single Market and Customs Union. Scottish people retain the right to decide their future via another Scottish independence referendum if their interests are not protected.
Means-goals:
Scotland’s interests will be protected if we:
Encourage the UK government to remain in the Single Market and Customs Union
Highlight the the EU and the Single Market are not the same
Highlight economic costs of leaving the Single Market/Customs Union
Encourage the UK government to adopt differential solution for Scotland
Highlight differential arrangements in EU framework (e.g. Norway)
Highlight differential possibilities/necessities in Northern Ireland
Encourage the UK government to permit Scottish independence referendum
Highlight the strong case/mandate for a Scottish independence vote
Highlight broken promises from 2014 regarding EU membership
Highlight democratic deficit between Scotland and UK (London)
Claims for action:
The UK government should retain Single Market and Customs Union membership, and embrace a ‘soft’ or ‘flexible’ Brexit. The UK government should permit the Scottish government to have input into negotiating positions for talks with the EU. The UK government should categorically protect the rights of EU citizens in the UK. The UK government should consider a differentiated Brexit solution for Scotland, like what is being considered for Northern Ireland. Proponents of Scottish independence should focus on building consensus rather than rushing into plans for an independence referendum.
Summarising phase one:
In this first phase, Nicola Sturgeon places emphasis on the need to ‘explore every option to protect Scotland’s interests’ (Sturgeon, 2016). The protection of interests is the stated overarching goal, and she portrays Scotland and/or the UK’s continued membership of the EU Single Market and Customs Union as the means by which they can achieve this goal. Sturgeon repeatedly demands that ‘Scotland’s voice’ (Sturgeon, 2016) be heard by the UK government, and that they be allowed to influence the negotiating position.
The prospect of a second Scottish independence referendum is introduced in her first statement on Brexit, specifically in reference to the ‘material change of circumstances’ caused by Britain’s decision to leave the EU. This, outlined in the SNP’s manifesto from 2016 (SNP, 2016), is used to justify a second independence referendum being ‘on the table’ (Sturgeon, 2016). However, she is at pains to not appear as an opportunist; ‘Independence was not my starting point. That remains the case. Protecting Scotland's interests is my starting point. (Sturgeon, 2016). This reflects the stated values of working in ‘good faith’ (Sturgeon, 2016)—open to rational collaboration, compromise, and constructive engagement.
Sturgeon is emotive regarding EU values, displaying overt internationalism; ‘Scotland is determined, despite Brexit, to remain an open, internationalist, outward looking nation.’ (Sturgeon, 2017). Civic, inclusionary, values are particularly prominent during this period.
2. Phase two: seeking a second EU membership referendum
Circumstances:
The people of Scotland voted to remain in the EU (62%). The UK government is ignoring/sidelining Scotland; Scotland as ‘an afterthought’ with an increasing democratic deficit that has been made more obvious by Brexit. Not treated as an equal partner. No consensus in the UK Parliament on Brexit terms; UK government adopting an extreme interpretation of the European referendum result. Prime Minister drawing red lines on Single Market and Customs Union, resulting in stalled negotiations and repeated extensions. Deals are fundamentally different to what was promised pre-referendum. Any form of Brexit damaging to Scotland. Claim of Right—the Scottish people as sovereign. SNP winning over half of the MEP seats on offer in Scotland; majority for remain parties.
Values:
Scotland as an open and outward-looking, welcoming, European country. Internationalist values; participation in international institutions and maintaining close relations. European solidarity. Supporting internationalisation of Scottish businesses. Scottish government as being fully-engaged with all opposing views, both in Westminster and in the Scottish Parliament (re: Brexit and/or independence). Mature governance and debate. Seeking consensus, not confrontation; a contrast to Westminster. Honesty and transparency.
Goals:
To revoke Article 50 with immediate effect, and ensure the UK does not leave the EU without a deal. To guarantee a second European referendum based on the terms of any deal, with ‘remain’ on the ballot. To halt Brexit or mitigate the most damaging effects of Brexit for Scotland. Regarding independence; to ready the primary legislation ahead of a request for transfer of power from Westminster in the case that Scotland’s interests are not protected. Scotland to have increased powers, e.g. on immigration policy. For Scotland to have the opportunity to conduct a second Scottish independence referendum.
Means-goals:
Mitigating negative consequences of Brexit demands us to:
Encourage UK government to guarantee a second European referendum
Highlight right to vote on a deal which is different than anticipated
Highlight difference between voting on EU membership and Single Market
Encourage UK government to guarantee there will not be a no-deal Brexit
Highlight economic risks; use predictive reports and numbers
Highlight extremism in the UK Parliament (contrast vs Scottish)
Highlight referendum was not a mandate for a hard Brexit
Encourage the UK government to permit Scottish independence referendum
Highlight the strong case/mandate for a Scottish independence vote
Highlight the risk of a reversal of devolution (‘power grab’)
Highlight ‘deep’ democratic deficit between Scotland and UK (London)
Claims for action:
The UK government should call a second European referendum based on the terms of a deal. The UK government should not allow a no-deal Brexit under any circumstances; revoke Article 50 if this becomes the likely outcome. UK Prime Minister should immediately request an extension to Article 50 (after her proposed deal was defeated). The UK government should drop all ‘red lines’ impeding negotiations. The UK government and Scottish government should collaborate like 2014 to deliver a well-organised ‘gold standard’ Scottish independence referendum (to occur if Brexit proceeds). Scottish voters should vote for the SNP in European elections as a pro-EU support message. The Scottish Parliament should debate respectfully and seek common ground; thorough, thoughtful, and constructive conversations and a conscious aversion to division and polarisation.
Summarising phase two:
This second phase is dominated by Sturgeon’s call for a second European referendum; a demand that emerged towards the end of 2018 (The Guardian, 2018, 7 October), and first appeared in a recorded speech transcript in February 2019—‘the alternative option is now the preferred one for me and many others - a second referendum offering people the choice to remain in the EU’ (Sturgeon, 2019). This is in the context of Prime Minister Theresa May’s proposed deal being emphatically defeated (House of Commons Library, 2021) and the prospect of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit on 29 March 2019 becoming real (note: it was later extended).
In June 2019, in a speech delivered in Brussels, Sturgeon says, ‘checking whether people across the UK still want to go ahead with Brexit is the obvious – to my mind - democratic course of action. So that is what my Government will argue for and we will work with others to try to bring that about.’ (Sturgeon, 2019). She portrays her role at this time as one of ‘persuading the UK not to leave the European Union, or at the very least, not leave the European Union in the most damaging way possible.’ (Sturgeon, 2019). The decision on Brexit, she argues, ‘should now return to the people’ (Sturgeon, 2019).
The liberal, internationalist, and civic values remain constant during this period, too; but there is a more profound emphasis on consensus-seeking, common ground, and cooperation. Securing a second Scottish independence referendum remains a stated target for Sturgeon; ‘for Scotland the best solution for the long term is to become an independent nation.’ (Sturgeon, 2019).
3. Phase three: demanding a second Scottish independence referendum
Circumstances:
Brexit wreaking havoc on the UK (inc. Scotland) economy; closure of the French border to UK freight, labour scarcity, recruitment problems, interrupted supply chains, supermarket shortages, cost of doing business increasing. A far harder Brexit than was initially imagined. Inflation and economic crisis worse in the UK than elsewhere. Cost of living crisis. Inability to tackle economic issues due to lack of power. SNP democratic mandate gives Scottish people choice; election result of 2019 gave SNP majority in Scottish Parliament on a manifesto promising independence referendum. All options exhausted for influencing outcomes of the Brexit negotiations.
Values:
Honest and respectful debate. Cooperation and collaboration, not acrimony or division. A green, fair, progressive Scotland. Working together for the common good. Meeting the obligation to make positive change. Grown-up approach to politics. Equal partnerships.
Goals:
Get permission for a Scottish independence referendum from the UK government and/or the UK courts. Offer people an ‘informed choice’ on Scotland’s future. Make the Scottish Parliament independent of Westminster; able to tackle the cost of living crisis. Achieve independence. Defend the Scottish Parliament from UK ‘power grabs’. Scotland’s future in Scotland’s hands (self-determination). Build a better future for Scotland. Mitigate damage of Brexit while offering an alternative. Lead Scotland safely out of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Means-goals:
To ensure Scotland’s future, we must:
Demand second Scottish independence referendum
Highlight tangible current crises wholly or partially caused by Brexit
Highlight SNP’s democratic mandate from 2019 general election
Highlight poll numbers indicating majority support for independence
Highlight contrasts between Scottish and UK Governments/Parliaments
Highlight ‘deep’ democratic deficit between Scotland and UK (London)
Highlight undemocratic behaviour of Conservative government
Highlight benefits of independence; better, wealthier, fairer future
Claims for action:
The Scottish people should see the benefits of independence and support a referendum. The UK government should abide by the SNP’s mandate and permit a second independence referendum; no democratic justification for blocking it. The Scottish Parliament should do politics differently than the UK; mature debate and consensus-building.
Summarising phase three:
This phase is characterised by Sturgeon’s shift to an all-out demand for a second Scottish independence referendum; coinciding with the UK-EU deal and the practical implementation of that deal.
Here we can see a return to similar discursive themes that Whigham (2019) revealed in his research, indicating a return by Sturgeon to highlight the practical benefits of independence and drawbacks of union; specifically with regards to crises caused by Brexit, but also in broader terms that are similar to the 2014 campaign. This is despite clear obstacles, for example the confirmation from the UK Supreme Court in November 2022 that the Scottish government requires the UK government’s permission to legally hold a referendum (The Supreme Court, 2022).
The values being emphasised remain firmly within the confines of ‘civic’ definitions; this reinforces a consistent civic nationalist identity, which is further supported by a green agenda, with Glasgow hosting COP26 in October 2021.
My expectations were to see a somewhat reserved narrative; reasoning zeroed on securing a referendum on democratic/legal grounds. What emerges is different; Sturgeon makes emotive appeals for self-determination. ‘Independence would give us the wherewithal to build a better, wealthier, fairer future. That is the prize we should now grasp.’ (Sturgeon, 2022)
Conclusion
In analysing Nicola Sturgeon’s speeches between 2016 and 2022, we have a front-row seat to watch the leader of a pro-independence (civic) nationalist party navigate an incredibly complex political and social situation. Sturgeon’s ambition for Scotland to be an independent nation is unquestionable, and the balance of the UK European referendum results provided an opportunity to further that ambition.
However, we can understand her discourse in the ‘first phase’ as tempered and measured; emphasis is placed on protecting Scotland’s interests by retaining the benefits of EU membership and influencing the UK negotiating position. An independence referendum is portrayed here as the ‘failsafe’ option.
Moving into the ‘second phase’ we are told that Scottish voices are not being listened to in Westminster, which is beholden to extremist influence. Now the emphasis changes to preventing a no-deal Brexit by revoking Article 50 or conducting a second referendum on EU membership once the terms of a deal are clear.
Finally, we arrive at the ‘third phase’; the UK has secured a deal and exited the EU. A second Scottish independence referendum is now presented as the one and only option to build a better future for Scotland in light of the negative consequences of Brexit.
This essay was written by Matt Goolding in January 2023.
Many thanks to Dr. Maryse Helbert, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Groningen, for her guidance and feedback on this essay.
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